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E
xcessive consumption of alcohol has been associated with adverse health effects, including cirrhosis of the liver, pancreatitis, gastritis, and various cancers (Friedman and Klatsky, 1993) . Excessive drinking has also been charged with generating a myriad of negative outcomes stemming from behavioral change including highway fatalities (Ruhm, 1996) , suicide (Carpenter, 2004) , youth risky sexual behavior (Markowitz, Kaestner, and Grossman, 2005) , transmission of STDs (Chesson, Harrison, and Kassler, 2000) , child abuse (Markowitz and Grossman, 2000) , nuisance crime (Carpenter, 2005) , and workplace accidents (Ohsfeldt and Morrisey, 1997) . Economic theory suggests that the market failure due to the presence of negative externalities may be corrected by the application of an excise tax, but Saffer and Chaloupka (1994) and Kenkel (1996) argue that excise taxes on alcoholic beverages are too low to correct for these externalities. In addition to concern for health and safety, many oppose consumption of alcoholic beverages because of moral or religious beliefs.
Against this backdrop, state governments have a variety of policies in place that intervene in the market for alcoholic beverages. Prominent among these have been laws that infl uence the prices of alcoholic beverages. At the end of 2002, for example, all states levied excise taxes on beer and in 32 "license" states the primary intervention in the spirits market was also an excise tax. In the remaining "control" states, spirits were sold only through state stores where prices were set by legislated markups on wholesale prices. In recent decades, no state has converted from "license" to "control" and conversions in the other direction have been rare. 1 In addition to being relatively low, many excise taxes have fallen when measured in real terms. From 1990 to 2003, for example, the average state beer tax fell from 17.1 to 13.6 cents per gallon measured in 1982 cents, and the average state spirits tax fell from $2.53 to $2.06. While the federal beer tax increased from 22.2 to 42.6 cents in 1991, infl ation eroded it to 31.5 cents by 2003, and the real federal spirits tax decreased from $9.56 to $7.34 over the same time span. In fact, even when measured in 2003 prices, the combined excise tax on beer is below one cent per ounce.
2 Because of their relatively low levels, excise taxes on alcohol raise only modest revenues for state governments. In 2002, excise taxes on beer, wine, and spirits provided states with approximately 3.2 billion dollars in revenues, sales taxes on alcoholic beverages provided approximately six billion dollars of additional revenue, and control states collected nearly 800 million dollars in revenue net of expenses through operation of their state-owned spirits stores (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006) . Summed together, these policies were responsible for approximately one percent of state government revenues, a contribution slightly lower than the roughly 12 billion dollars states earned from excise taxes on tobacco products for the same year (Orzechowski and Walker, 2003) . Despite their relatively low levels, alcohol taxes are likely targets for increases because they are one of the few taxes palatable to the general public. A survey released by the American Medical Association Offi ce of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse reveals that while 65 percent of respondents favored increasing alcohol taxes, 75 percent or more were against raising either the sales or income taxes or reducing spending on social services, Medicaid, or education (American Medical Association, 2004) .
In addition to tax and price policies, federal, state, and local governments have a long history of enacting laws that ban the sale of alcoholic beverages. Most famously, the eighteenth amendment to the U.S. constitution banned the sale of alcoholic beverages from 1920 until 1933 when the twenty-fi rst amendment repealed it and explicitly gave states the right to restrict the sale of alcohol. Although Mississippi repealed the last statewide ban on the sale of alcohol in 1966, numerous local governments still ban the sale of alcohol, and many states have in place bans on the Sunday sale of alcohol. Sunday sales bans were originally an outgrowth of Blue Laws enacted before the American Revolution to regulate behavior on the Christian Sabbath. They were revived toward the end of the nineteenth century as part of the temperance movement and again after the end of Prohibition when states regained control of laws governing the sale of alcohol (Christian Science Monitor, 2003) . At the end of 2002, 11 states had bans on Sunday sales of beer and 27 states plus the District of Columbia had such bans in place for spirits.
Sunday sales bans, and to a lesser extent excise taxes, have been the focus of much recent legislative and judicial activity. The Distilled Spirits Council of Because these interventions raise the full price of alcohol, some consumers may choose to purchase substitute products or to circumvent them by traveling to jurisdictions where laws or enforcement are more lenient. Higher prices, for example, may cause some consumers to travel to other states where prices are lower and some consumers may shop in other states when faced with a Sunday sales ban at home. Such activity is of concern because it undermines the ability of states to curb drinking, infl uences the amount of revenue states collect through taxation, and wastes resources by imposing unnecessary time and transportation costs on consumers.
The literature contains several papers that consider commodity tax competition and cross-border shopping from a theoretical perspective. Mintz and Tulkens (1986) examine commodity taxation in a general equilibrium model of two countries trading two goods. Although their model is quite general, this generality comes with a price; the paper reaches few general conclusions regarding the welfare effects of tax competition. More to the point, it does not consider the effect of country size on strategic interaction, an element likely to be important when explaining cross-border traffi c between U.S. states. Kanbur and Keen (1993) develop a partial equilibrium model of two countries with one taxed good where population sizes are allowed to differ. Two predictions from their model are of particular relevance to this study. First, they fi nd that the smaller country always undercuts the tax of the larger country. Second, they find that per-capita revenue is larger in the smaller country even though the smaller country has a lower tax rate, implying that it must be exporting sales to the larger country. The prediction for the U.S. is, thus, that smaller states will undercut the taxes of their larger neighbors and earn revenues from cross-border shoppers.
Empirical studies in this literature fall into two categories: those showing the interdependence of policies across jurisdictions and those showing that policy differences can result in cross-border shopping or migration. Conway and Rork (2004) find evidence that states' inheritance, gift, and estate taxes are infl uenced by the reliance on those taxes of competitor states. Rork (2003) shows that tobacco, gasoline, personal income, sales, and corporate income taxes are affected by the rates of those taxes in neighboring states. Although the implication in these papers is that competition is driven by cross-border shopping or migration, the papers do not directly test whether migration or sales in a state are infl uenced by the Numerous authors in the tobacco literature have shown that interstate differences in cigarette taxation have led to cross-border shopping or long-distance cigarette smuggling (Baltagi and Levin, 1986; Coats, 1995; Saba, Beard, Ekelund, and Ressler, 1995; Thursby and Thursby, 2000; Yurekli and Zhang, 2000; and Stehr, 2005) . If tax or policy differences lead consumers to cross state lines to purchase alcoholic beverages, then this behavior should be refl ected by unexpected variation in sales across states. Table 2 presents average state per-capita annual sales of beer and spirits for the years 1990-2004 from DISCUS. Sales of spirits in New Hampshire, Washington DC, Delaware, and Nevada are very high, while sales in Utah and Pennsylvania are very low, relative to other states. Dispersion in per-capita beer sales is not as great but is also evident. While the data are consistent with cross-border traffi c, they are also consistent with other hypotheses. Low sales in Utah, for example, are likely due to the strong religious infl uences in that state, and high sales in Nevada are likely due to the strong tourism and gambling industries.
Previous research on alcoholic beverages has attempted to separate these effects, but the focus has been on border crossing in response to price differences with little attention given to Sunday sales bans. In addition, previous studies have drawn on price data, but prices may be endogenous if they are set by suppliers in response to changing demand conditions. 3 The tax base is defi ned as total sales tax revenues divided by the sales tax rate. Baltagi and Goel (1990) and Baltagi and Griffi n (1995) 4 In the same year, the lowest and highest prices for a 750 ml bottle of J&B Scotch were $17.25 and $26.67, respectively, and the difference between prices at the 25 th and 75 th percentiles was $2.30. Furthermore, spirits can be stored for a greater period of time, allowing shoppers to stock up and achieve greater savings per trip.
Several authors have also examined alcohol taxation in the United Kingdom. Crawford and Tanner (1995) find that price elasticities for beer, wine, and spirits in southeastern England began to diverge from elasticities for the UK as a whole in 1993, right after completion of the single European market relaxed limits on the legal importation of alcoholic beverages for personal use. Although these results are consistent with an increase in crossborder shopping through southeastern port cities such as Dover to destinations in continental Europe, the differences are only statistically signifi cant for wine. A follow up study by Crawford, Smith, and Tanner (1999) failed to fi nd any differences in elasticities between the 1989-1992 and 1993-1996 periods for beer, wine, or spirits. The failure to fi nd divergence in elasticities is not, however, conclusive evidence against the presence of border crossing because the standard errors on many of the point estimates are quite large. These two studies and an additional one by Smith (1999) all fi nd that tax revenues could be increased by increasing taxes on beer or wine, but that the tax on spirits is already near its revenue maximizing level.
This author is not aware of any research that examines the effect of Sunday sales bans on either own-state sales or cross-border shopping. Even if price differences appear suffi cient to motivate cross-border traffi c, they may be correlated with Sunday bans and other alcohol policies. In this case, these variables must be analyzed together in order to avoid any omitted variable bias that may emerge if they are considered in isolation. Indeed, in the tobacco literature, previous work fi nds that omitting smoking restrictions alters the estimated effect of cigarette taxes (Tauras, 1999) . This paper contains three key contributions. First, it estimates the effect of the repeal of Sunday sales bans on state sales of beer and spirits. Second, it estimates the effect of these repeals along with interstate price variation on the degree of state border crossing to purchase beer and spirits. Third, it relies on variation in taxes, which is more plausibly exogenous than variation in prices, to identify the own-state and cross-border price effects. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the second section outlines the empirical specification, the third section describes the data used in the analysis, the fourth section presents the results, and the fi fth section concludes the paper with a discussion of policy implications.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Price endogeneity is a key concern in identifying both own-state and cross-border price responses. It is quite plausible that beer and spirits suppliers adjust prices in response to changing demand conditions. For this reason, I follow the approach common in the literature and use state excise taxes on beer to identify the own-state response to changes in the beer price. For spirits, I use the excise tax on spirits in license states and percent markups on wholesale prices in control states. Because I use a specifi cation that includes state fi xed effects, it is essential that changes in the beer tax, spirits tax, and markups are passed through to changes in prices. Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) show that although the raw correlation between the level of alcohol taxes and prices can be quite low, changes in alcohol taxes are passed through to prices within a quarter of a year. Using data from Alaska, Kenkel (2005) also fi nds a strong relationship between changes in alcohol taxes and prices. Although this argues for the use of tax data, the use of such data presents two dilemmas. First, it is unclear how to compare excise taxes on spirits in license states with percent markups in control states. This problem can be solved by multiplying excise taxes and markups by their respective pass through rates to prices. Following Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, I regress prices on excise taxes and markups with state and year fi xed effects included and a correction for serial correlation of the errors. The results of these regressions, shown in Table 3 , confi rm that the relationships between changes in state beer and spirits taxes and changes in prices are statistically signifi cant. I then multiply by one plus the state sales tax on alcoholic beverages to create the fi tted prices I ultimately use to construct measures of interstate border crossing. With the inclusion of state fixed effects in the final specification, identifi cation of the coeffi cients on the border-crossing variables will come from plausibly exogenous within-state variation over time in excise taxes, markups, and sales taxes.
It is also possible that repeals of Sunday sales bans are endogenous. One might argue that repeals were introduced and passed in those states where attitudes toward drinking were more permissive. These more permissive attitudes might then lead both to greater increases in drinking and the repeal of Sunday sales bans. If this hypothesis were true, then we would expect to see greater increases in sales in states that repealed their bans than in states that did not in the years before bans were repealed. Table 4 reports the results of regressions of the log of per-capita state beer or spirits sales on state and year fi xed effects, demographic variables, and a dummy for states that repealed bans interacted with a linear time trend. The sample begins in 1990 Sales of beer or spirits in a state are the sum of sales to members of that state plus sales to individuals who do not reside in that state, or exported sales. Exports may be identified by a positive association between sales in a state and a measure of cross-border demand from residents of neighboring states. Similarly, imports may be identifi ed by a negative association between own-state sales and own-state resident demand for out-of-state purchases. The import and export functions I construct are similar to those Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) use to capture cross-border shopping for cigarettes. I propose two measures of exported sales: the fi rst captures exports resulting from price differences and the second measures exports that are due to differences in Sunday sales laws. Population will clearly affect the degree of border crossing. Small states may experience large percentage increases in sales if they are exporting sales to a populous adjacent state whereas the opposite holds true for large states that border small states. 
Both import variables are constructed to be non-negative, so the expected sign on their coeffi cients is negative. The model also contains other variables that should affect sales of beer and spirits. I include own-beverage tax and markups as well as the taxes and markups of other alcoholic beverages to control for own-and cross-beverage price effects. Sunday sales bans are included to show the effect of own-state bans on own-state sales independent of any border-crossing effects. I include income because increased consumption of alcoholic beverages has been associated with higher income. Fraction black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American, and the fraction of the population that falls within specifi c age categories, are included to control for the possibility that drinking habits vary by race, ethnicity, and age.
8 I include the state unemployment rate because those without jobs may drink as a result of frustration or anxiety or because they have more free time. Unobserved determinants of drinking may also vary by state. Residents of Wisconsin, for example, may have a more positive attitude toward beer consumption than the residents of other states because many of their ancestors emigrated from countries such as Germany where beer is quite popular or because their state is home to Milwaukee, a city long associated with brewing beer. In addition, states have a Byzantine array of laws affecting the sale of alcoholic beverages, many of which are unique to particular states and have shown little variation over time.
9 With these factors in mind, I estimate specifi cations that include state fixed effects and rely on within-state variation over time for identifi cation. I also include year dummies to capture the downward trend in per-capita beer sales that has occurred from 1990 to 2004 and the U-shaped trend in spirits sales that has occurred over the same period. Other observable characteristics of states such as church membership, whether a state borders Canada or Mexico, and the broader retail structure such as state control of spirits stores or the availability of alcohol in grocery stores may also be important determinants of state sales of alcoholic beverages. Because data on church membership are only available for 1990 and the other variables are largely time invariant, their infl uence on drinking will be subsumed in the state fi xed effects and they are excluded from the analysis. The fi nal equation for estimation is, thus, 
where logsales jt is the log of gallons of beer or spirits per capita per year, α j is a state fi xed effect, Z jt is the vector of time varying control variables, δ t are year fi xed effects, and ε jt is an error term. Because the dependent variable is log of per-capita sales, the coeffi cient on Ban jt can be interpreted as the percent change in sales associated with repeal of a Sunday sales ban. Because a ban is coded as one when it is in effect and zero otherwise, the negative of the coeffi cient gives the percent change in sales associated with repeal of a ban.
DATA
Summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 5 for a complete description of age categories. 9 Texas law, for example, stipulates that an on-premise alcoholic beverage served to a customer between 10am and noon on Sunday must be accompanied by food. New York law requires that spirits stores be owned by a single owner who lives within a certain distance of the store, effectively banning chain stores. Puerto Rico bans the sale of alcoholic beverages during hurricane emergencies.
refl ect the price of a specifi ed quantity of a particular branded product. The beer price for the 1990s, for example, was for a six pack of Miller Lite or Budweiser. Although this price may be higher or lower than beer prices as a whole, differences in this price should refl ect differences in beer prices across states with reasonable accuracy because they are likely to be driven primarily by factors common across brands such as taxes, regulations, transportation costs, the level of competition, or income.
A different problem occurs when ACCRA changes the good whose price is surveyed. In 2000, for example, ACCRA switched the brand of beer included in the survey. Because there are no data on both goods for the same year, it is impossible to know the true relative prices of the goods. In these cases, I multiply all of the new prices by a factor such that the fi rst year of the new good has the same price as the last year of the old good. Although not ideal, this normalization avoids a large spurious change in the price in the year that the good changes. It also preserves consistency in the magnitude of price differences with the exception of the two transition years. 10 I defl ate the price data to 1982 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Data on state sales of beer and spirits, Sunday sales laws for spirits, excise taxes, and sales taxes on alcoholic beverages are from DISCUS and state statutes. Data on Sunday sales laws for beer are drawn from the Alcohol Policy Information System (APIS).
11 State level data on unemployment rates; per-capita income; fraction black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American; the fraction of the population that falls within specifi c age categories; and county level population data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics online fi les. Tables 6 and 7 show the results with no border-crossing variables included and without the time-trend variables to control for endogeneity of Sunday sales bans. In both the beer and spirits regressions, the coeffi cient on own-beverage state tax is negative and signifi cant indicating that higher taxes are associated with signifi cantly lower sales. The coefficients on Sunday sales bans are also negative and signifi cant in both regressions and imply that the average state saw per-capita sales of beer or spirits increase by 4.1 percent or 5.2 percent, respectively, after repeal of a Sunday sales ban. In the second columns, when the linear time trends for repeal states are included, the effect of repealing a ban on spirits decreases to 3.5 percent and the effect of repealing a ban on the sale of beer drops to a marginally signifi cant 2.4 percent. These results may appear surprising. Beer has a limited shelf life, is bulky, and is often consumed while viewing sports on Sundays. Spirits, on the other hand, are compact, have a long shelf life, and are not traditionally associated with viewing sports. Because Sunday bans are more likely to affect beer drinkers, their repeal might seem more likely to increase beer sales. I consider two explanations for these seemingly counterintuitive results. First, in each of the six states where the Sunday ban on the sale of beer was repealed, the ban on the Sunday sale of wine and spirits was also repealed. So, anyone wanting to purchase alcohol on Sunday saw their choice go from zero beverage categories to three, creating little scope for the repeal to affect substitution patterns between beverages. In the other six states where the ban on the Sunday sale of spirits was repealed, however, Sunday sales of beer were already legal. In these states, those who might go shopping for alcoholic beverages on Sunday saw their options increase to include spirits and those who bought beer because spirits were unavailable no longer had to make this compromise. If the substitution hypothesis is correct, then sales of spirits should increase more in those states where beer was already for sale on Sundays than in the other states. To test this hypothesis, I create a dummy variable equal to one when the repeal affected only the Sunday sale of spirits and equal to zero, otherwise and interact it with Sunday spirits ban. The coeffi cient of the interacted variable in the spirits regression indicates whether the effect of repealing a Sunday sales ban differed in those states where the sale of beer was already allowed. The results indicate no statistically signifi cant difference (p = 0.48).
RESULTS
The first columns of
12 Greater scope for substitution 10 The is, thus, an unlikely explanation for the differing results with respect to beer and spirits.
A second explanation lies in the availability of alcohol in grocery stores. Spirits could not be sold in grocery stores in ten of the 12 states that repealed their bans on the Sunday sale of spirits.
13 If the purchase of alcohol may be conveniently included with regular grocery shopping, then a Sunday sales ban may have little effect. If purchasing alcohol requires a trip to a special store, then allowing sales on Sunday when shoppers have more time to make an extra trip may have a greater effect. To test this hypothesis, I create a dummy variable equal to one when a state allows the sale of spirits in grocery stores and Table 5 for a list of data sources and the second section of the paper for a complete description of variables.
zero otherwise. I then interact this variable with Sunday spirits ban and include it in the spirits regression. The coeffi cient on the interacted variable shows how sales of spirits changed in states that allowed grocery store sales relative to states that did not when a Sunday ban was repealed.
The results, shown in column 3 of Table 7 , indicate that sales of spirits in states that did not allow grocery store sales increased by 7.2 percent following repeal of a Sunday ban. In the two states that allowed grocery sales, the effect was 10.0 percent less; adding the two coeffi cients together yields an overall decrease in sales of 2.8 percent that is not signifi cantly different from zero. The results support the hypothesis that a Sunday sales ban is binding when a grocery store ban is already in effect. The results of a similar regression for beer are shown in column 3 of Table 6 . Although the coeffi cients have the same Notes: T-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include state and year fi xed effects; unemployment; fraction of the state population that is Hispanic, black, Native American, and Asian; and fraction of the population that falls into eight age categories. Sample is for years [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Price export spirits and Price import spirits are functions of state taxes and markups on spirits. See Table 5 for a list of data sources and the second section of the paper for a complete description of variables. signs as in the spirits regression, the difference between states that allow and do not allow grocery sales is not statistically signifi cant. The coeffi cient on Sunday beer ban is now just signifi cant at the 5 percent level and, thus, consistent with the notion that repeal raises sales when grocery store sales are not allowed. Nevertheless, this fi nding is not as robust as the results for spirits. In the case of beer, there are again two repeal states that allow grocery store sales, but four rather than ten repeal states with no grocery store sales. The failure to fi nd a robust effect for beer may, therefore, lie with the smaller number of repeal states that did not allow grocery store sales. With fewer identifying observations, any effects are less likely to be statistically signifi cant. The fourth columns of Tables 6 and  7 show the results with the import and export variables included. The coeffi cients on the border-crossing variables for beer are insignifi cant and the inclusion of these variables has a negligible effect on the coeffi cient on the state beer tax. The beer tax, thus, acts by reducing consumption of beer rather than by displacing sales across state borders. In the spirits regression, the coeffi cient of Sunday export is positive and signifi cant, implying that repeal of Sunday bans acts not only by increasing own-state consumption of spirits but also through changes in Sunday shopping across state borders.
14 The coeffi cient on Price export is positive and statistically signifi cant and the coeffi cient on the state spirits tax has decreased by roughly 40 percent, implying that this portion of the price response of spirits is due to border crossing. It would seem that if Price export were signifi cant, then Price import should capture the same effect from the other side of the border, yet this variable is insignifi cant. The explanation for the discrepancy likely rests with the theoretical prediction of Kanbur and Keen (1993) that small states will tend to undercut large states. If this result holds, then we expect to see excess sales due to exports in small states and low sales due to imports in large states. When exports equal imports, imports are more difficult to identify because they are spread among larger populations and lead to less variation in per-capita sales. In the case of Sunday sales, even if bans are equally prevalent in small and large states, exports will still be easier to identify because they can come from excesses in sales to residents of potentially multiple bordering states. Imports, by contrast, appear in the data as a dearth of sales to own state residents.
To fi nd the price elasticity of demand for spirits, I fi rst compute the percent change in quantity from a one-cent increase in the spirits tax using the results from column 3 of Table 7 . The corresponding percent change in price is computed by multiplying one cent by the pass-through rate from tax to price and dividing by the average price of a gallon of spirits.
15 This calculation yields a price elasticity of -2.44, which is higher than most other recent estimates. Baltagi and Goel (1990) and Baltagi and Griffi n (1995) , for example, both fi nd the elasticity of spirits to be -0.7, but they do not control for cross-price effects. Such effects are important because states sometimes raise excise taxes on beer, wine, and spirits at the same time. If increases are coordinated, those who might substitute away from spirits if their prices rise in isolation may not do so if the price of beer increases at the same time. Not controlling for state beer and wine taxes may, therefore, induce downward bias in the coeffi cient on the state spirits tax. Indeed, with state beer and wine taxes omitted, the calculated price elasticity falls to -0.65. The price elasticity of demand for beer is also of interest to policy makers. Using the results from column 3 of Table 6 , I calculate this elasticity to be -1.02.
16
From a tax revenue perspective, it may not matter whether decreases in sales are due to decreases in drinking or displacement of sales across state borders. If policy makers wish to know the effect of these policies on own-state drinking, however, cross border sales become important. The coefficient on the state spirits tax from column 4 of Table 7 yields a price elasticity reflecting drinking equal to -1.44. The portion of the elasticity that is due to border crossing may be taken as the difference with the elasticity from column 2, (-1.00), but it is also possible to calculate it directly from the coeffi cient on the export variable. Since the export variable differs by state, this also allows for calculation of state specifi c elasticities. I simulate the effect of a one-cent tax increase by recalculating Price export for each state individually, assuming that the fi tted price of that state has increased by one cent multiplied by the pass-through rate. 17 The change in Price export multiplied by its coeffi cient yields the changes in exports for the given state and each of its neighbors. The decrease in own-state exports plus any increase in the exports of neighboring states then equals the change in cross-border sales for the given state. The percent change out of total sales can then be divided by the percent change in price to arrive at a simulated price elasticity due to border crossing. The results of this exercise are presented for each state in column 2 of Table 8 . The average state has an elasticity of border crossing equal to -0.35. Although this figure is not especially close to the -1.00 fi gure calculated above, the discrepancy is not unreasonable given the standard errors on the coeffi cients. The estimates vary widely by state as would be expected given the variation in bordering states and populations. Columns 3 and 4 present the total elasticities and the percentages that are due to border crossing for each state. Of the lower 48 states, Florida has the lowest with only 2.1 percent and Delaware is highest at 52.5 percent.
18
In license states, the effect of an excise tax increase on tax revenues depends on the price elasticity of demand and the fraction of the price that is made up by the excise tax. Using the regression results, I calculate the change in tax revenues that would result from increases in state excise taxes. Because demand is elastic and total expenditures will decrease, it is quite likely that consumers will shift some of these expenditures to other goods, which may be subject to other excise taxes or a state sales tax. I adopt the conservative assumption that consumers either save 16 The ACCRA prices refl ect the price of a six-pack of Budweiser, but because this is a very common brand whose price is likely to refl ect beer prices in general, no adjustment to this elasticity is necessary. 17 In states with no excise tax, this is equivalent to levying a new excise tax equal to one cent per gallon. 18 The coeffi cient on Price export represents an average marginal treatment effect. If one makes the fairly strong assumption that this treatment effect is constant, it is possible to calculate the percent of sales that are due to exports for a particular observation as Price export multiplied by its coeffi cient. Under this assumption, 1.0 percent of spirits sales are due to border crossing that arises from tax differences. A similar calculation implies that 0.3 percent of spirits sales are due to border crossing that arises from Sunday sales bans. "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" - the money or spend it on items that are untaxed. Even with this assumption, because the state excise taxes on both beer and spirits average only two to three percent of the total retail prices and are never greater than 12 percent, in no case would a state lose tax revenues from a modest tax increase.
In control states, predicting the outcome of a price increase for spirits is complicated by the insignifi cance of the coefficient on the markup. This result may have occurred because there are only 18 control states or because, unlike nominal excise taxes, markups are unaffected by infl ation and, hence, display less within-state variation over time, which is the source of identifi cation in a model such as this one that includes state fi xed effects. In any case, it seems nonsensical to assume that an increase in the price of spirits would not affect sales. I instead assume that the elasticity in these states is the same as that calculated from changes in the state spirits tax in license states. Similar to the case of an excise tax increase, the effect of a price increase on tax revenues depends on the fraction of the price that goes to the state in the form of profi t. If this margin were suffi ciently large, then the profi ts states earn from their spirits stores would decline following an increase in the price. Some of the highest prices and presumably highest margins occur in Alabama, where the state reports that one-third of its revenues from the sale of spirits are used to fund state government programs (Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 2004 . If the profi t margin or effective tax is one-third of the price, then the "tax elasticity" is one-third of the price elasticity, or in the case of Alabama, -1.70/3 = -0.57. Because the absolute value of the tax elasticity is less than one, total profits or "tax revenues" would still increase if prices were raised. Other control states generally have lower prices than Alabama, suggesting that profi t margins in these states are less than one-third of the retail price. In states where the absolute value of the total elasticity is less than three, the tax elasticities are all less than one. So, in these states an increase in the price of spirits would increase profi ts and revenues for state programs. In the states where the absolute value of the total elasticity is greater than three, information on state margins is required to determine the effect on profi ts. The effect on cross-border sales of an end to a Sunday ban can be simulated by fi rst recalculating the Sunday export variable for a particular state under the assumption that the ban has been repealed. The change in the Sunday export variable multiplied by its coeffi cient then equals the change in exports due to the repeal of the ban, assuming that no other states also repealed their bans. The sum of any new exports from the given state plus any decreases in the exports of surrounding states then equals the total change in cross-border sales for the given state. The results of these calculations performed for 2001 are listed in column 2 of Table  9 . Column 1 lists the effect on own-state drinking from the coeffi cients listed in the fi nal column of Table 7 , column 3 lists the total change in sales from repeal of a ban, and column 4 lists the percent of the total change that is due to changes in cross-border sales. The simulation indicates that Delaware, Rhode Island, and Idaho would experience the largest percentage increases in sales if they were to relax their bans and no neighboring states followed suit, an unsurprising prediction given that these states are bordered by more populous states that had bans in place in 2001.
CONCLUSION
The results of this paper have policy implications for those who would raise excise taxes either to generate revenue or to correct for the negative externalities associated with excessive drinking. First, higher taxes on beer and spirits reduce drinking. Second, although consumers do cross state borders in response to increases in the state excise tax on spirits, in the vast majority of states, this activity is small enough that modest tax or price hikes would still raise tax revenues. Third, the change in state sales of spirits overstates the effect of tax or price policies on drinking because part of this change is due to displacement of sales across state borders. Fourth, the presence of cross-border shopping implies that if taxes on spirits are to be increased, they will be more effective in reducing drinking if they are coordinated across states.
Historically, Sunday sales bans were enacted to discourage drinking on the Christian Sabbath or as part of a broader set of restrictions on commerce that sought to enforce a day of rest. The argument that public policy should be used to impose the preferences of one group on another is diffi cult to defend on economic grounds, but we may ask whether Sunday sales bans have an economic rationale. Previous research has suggested that the repeal of these bans may increase traffi c fatalities (McMillan and Lapham, 2006) . Nevertheless, they are an oddly targeted intervention. Why should public policy target traffi c fatalities on Sundays and not other days?
If the goal is to reduce reckless behavior such as drunk driving, a ban on Friday or Saturday sales including those in bars and restaurants would probably be more effective. Alternatively, one might argue that it is desirable to give owners and employees of spirits stores one day of rest per week, but if rest is the goal, why should the policy be restricted to this narrow segment of the labor force?
19 In short, there is no apparent economic rationale for banning the sale of alcohol on this particular day of the week. At the same time, the rise in the sales of spirits when Sunday bans are lifted suggests that consumers are inconvenienced by these laws. Future research might further explore whether Sunday sales bans are an effective or efficient means of reducing the negative externalities associated with excessive drinking.
